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Abstract 
Prior research has addressed the role of single large firms in Regional Innovation 
Systems (RIS), ascribing them the role of “flagships”, “hubs” etc. Less attention has 
been given to RIS dynamics set in motion when a flagship abruptly rearranges or ceases 
local operations, as is often the outcome when it is acquired by, or merged into, a larger 
multinational enterprise. The two flagships of the Swedish pharmaceutical industry – 
Pharmacia and Astra - shifted from domestic to multinational ownership in 1995 and 
1998. We study consequences of this shift focusing on the following issues:  
i) Whether the shift in ownership brought about expansion or contraction of 
operations carried out internally by the two firms in Sweden. Observing notably 
declining activities in Pharmacia and expansion in Astra’s case we discuss control rights 
as a factor in national regulation affecting long-term strategising on part of key 
investors. 
ii) Whether the reduction of Pharmacia’s Swedish operations has been substituted 
by new firms derived from Pharmacia in the forms of divestments, spin-offs or start-
ups. Identification of the founders of new bio-pharmaceutical firms reveals very little 
manager-to-founder migration out of Pharmacia, whereas considerably derived activity 
comes out of firms divested or spun-off while Pharmacia was still fully operative. 
iii) Whether the recombinatorial capacity of the innovation system in the 
Stockholm-Uppsala region plays a role in explaining the paucity of Pharmacia-derived 
start-ups. Compared to the Copenhagen region (the other major biotech concentration in 
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Scandinavia) Stockholm-Uppsala’s RIS is shown generally to have been notably less 
effective in mobilising industrial managerial talent for bio-entrepreneurship. To better 
understand this inter-regional divergence we model differences between the two RIS in 
the supply of venture capital to the financing rounds of young biotech start-ups. In RIS 
dynamics venture capital has the critical function of connecting managerial talent with 
entrepreneurial resources. For new bio-firms this particular RIS-function is shown to 
have performed significantly weaker in the Stockholm-Uppsala region as compared to 
the Copenhagen counterpart. This deficiency may be expected to rank importantly 
among causes for the comparatively lower incidence of manager-to-founder transitions 
amongst Stockholm-Uppsala’s new biopharmaceutical firms. 
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Introduction 
Prior research has addressed the role of single large firms in generating clusters and 
Regional Innovation Systems of (RIS), ascribing them the role of “flagships”, “lead 
firms” or “hubs” (Audretsch 2000;Dunning 2000;Lazerson & Lorenzoni 2005). Much 
less attention has been given to the type of RIS development set in motion when a 
flagship abruptly rearranges or ceases its local operations, as is often the outcome when 
it is acquired by, or merged into, a larger multinational enterprise. Activities terminated 
by the flagship from a RIS perspective, may translate into dismantling of networks and 
relational capital, but may also set free resources and entrepreneurial potential. The 
present paper examines conditions affecting this outcome 
The two flagships of the Swedish pharmaceutical industry – Pharmacia and Astra - 
shifted from domestic to multinational ownership in 1995 and 1998. We study 
consequences of this shift focusing on the following issues:  
1) Whether the shift in ownership brought about expansion or contraction of operations 
carried out internally by the two firms in Sweden. Observing declining activities in 
Pharmacia and expansion in Astra’s case (Section 2) we discuss control rights and long-
term investment perspectives as causes behind this difference (Section 3).  
2) The findings on Pharmacia open the second issue whether dismantled activities have 
been substituted through the emergence and growth of new Pharmacia-derived firms. 
Section 4 studies various organisational forms for such derivations, finding particularly 
weak substitutional activity coming out of new start-up firms.  
3) By popular myth (e.g. Dagens Industri 2001;Kemivärlden Biotech med Kemisk 
Tidskrif 2001;Svenska Dagbladet 2000) the Stockholm-Uppsala (S-U) biotech cluster 
largely emerged through the bio-entrepreneurship derived from Pharmacia, so to speak 
arising from its ashes. Section 5 focuses on the prior organisational affiliation of 
founders of new biotech Drug Discovery Firms (DDFs), and finds that industrial 
managers were conspicuously absent specifically in creating entrepreneurial substitutes 
for Pharmacia. Moreover, compared to the Copenhagen region, the other major biotech 
concentration in Scandinavia, Stockholm-Uppsala’s RIS in Section 5 is shown generally 
to have been notably less effective in mobilising industrial managerial talent for DDF-
entrepreneurship. To contribute to the explanation of this difference Section 5 examines 
differences between the two regions in the way Venture Capital carried out its critical 
function of connecting managerial talent with entrepreneurial opportunities. 
Conclusions are presented in Section 6. 
2 The Emergence of the Swedish Pharmaceutical 
Industry 
2.1 General overview 
In the early 20th century, German and Swiss companies were dominating the 
pharmaceutical market and Sweden was dependent on imports and as late as until the 
1980s Sweden was net importer of pharmaceutics (Stankiewicz 1997). Pharmacists 
often founded firms in the early decades of the 20th century, which was the case for both 
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Astra and Pharmacia1. Domestic production of drugs discovered abroad was the main 
business approach (Stankiewicz 1997). Astra and Pharmacia were established in 1913 
and 1911 respectively, but R&D and drug development started later in the 1930s and 
with modest achievements. 
From an international perspective the Swedish pharmaceutical industry of the 1950s, 
was still of modest size, primarily adopting a follower strategy (Stankiewicz 1997). 
From the 1960s onwards, Swedish firms intensified R&D, innovating at a rate above the 
pharmaceutical industry in general, which exhibited a general decline of innovations in 
the 1960s and 1970s. 
By the end of the 1970s Sweden recorded seven major pharmaceutical companies; Aco, 
Astra, Ferring, Ferrosan, Kabi, Leo, and Pharmacia. During the 1980’s until 1991 the 
Swedish pharmaceutical industry were reduced to the three firms of Astra, Ferring, and 
Pharmacia. Despite the comparatively modest size of Swedish pharmaceutical, 
measured by number of employees and number of firms, through the 1990s they 
exhibited commercial success and accelerated growth. However, rapid growth of the 
pharmaceutical industry combined with shortage of university supply of graduates and 
declining public R&D spending in the 1980s resulted in faster growth of pharmaceutical 
activities in Swedish owned firms abroad compared to the domestic growth, which was 
especially the case for Astra (Stankiewicz 1997).  
The 1990’s were the time of large pharma mergers. Strategic incentives to merge 
included access to distribution channels and markets, spreading risks and getting access 
to drug development funding. The Swedish pharmaceutical companies followed the 
same trend and in the beginning of the 1990s. In the following, the histories of the two 
Swedish pharmaceutical firms – Astra and Pharmacia – are summarized.  
2.2 Astra 
Astra2 started its R&D activities in the 1930s. The activities where accelerated during 
the second World War but resulted in only one important product on the international 
market in the early 1960s, Xylocain3. The success story of Astra is primarily based on 
the R&D investments in the 1960s and onwards.  In the end of the 20th century the best 
selling Astra products were Losec, Pulmicort and Seloken. The strategy of long-term 
R&D investments and strategic acquisitions eventually paid off.   
Astra has traditionally acquired companies and incorporated them as autonomous 
subsidiaries within the group with distinct R&D areas. Tika was acquired in 1939. 
Hässle was acquired in 1942 and Astra-Hässle was formed. At the time of the 
acquisition Hässle was undertaking basic pharmaceutical activities without any 
important R&D or new product development. However, R&D investments in the 1950s 
and 1960s contributed to create an important player in the Swedish pharmaceutical 
industry (Stankiewicz 1997). For instance, the beta-blocker Seloken is a drug developed 
                                                 
1 The company Vitrum was formed as early as in 1877 by a pharmacist in Stockholm and may be 
regarded as the first Swedish pharmaceutical firm. 
2 Historical data presented in the following section is compiled from a number of sources; (Stankiewicz 
1997), (Killing 2004), (Lundberg 2006), (www.astrazeneca.se 2007), (Dolk & Sandström 2005), 
(Östholm 1991), wikipedia.org 
3 Xylocain was originally invented by two academic researchers, not by Astra. 
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by Astra-Hässle4. In the 1960s two companies dominated the development of beta-
blockers in the international pharmaceutical industry; Astra-Hässle and ICI. ICI spun-
off Zeneca in 1993, the latter with whom Astra merged with in 1999. Draco was 
acquired in 1955, and became the second Astra R&D company developing, among 
others, Pulmicort.  
In 1998, the year before the merger, Astra employed about 22.000 worldwide, out of 
which 8.000 were located in Sweden including 3.800 R&D employees. The annual 
turnover was around 57 billion SEK, net profit 16 billion SEK, and the annual R&D 
expenditures approximately 10.6 billion SEK. Corresponding figures for Zeneca was 
34.000 employees worldwide, annual turnover of 5.5 billion GBP, net profit of 1.1 
billion GBP, and annual R&D expenditures around 602 million GBP. In 2006, the 
number of employees in AstraZeneca located in Sweden amounts to 12.800, 
undertaking R&D and a large share of the manufacturing of drugs developed within the 
group. Detailed documentation on Astra’s development is offered in Appendix 1, 
2.3 Pharmacia’s pre-merger history 
Pharmacia’s history5 starts in the early 19th century and the company is the perhaps the 
only pharmaceutical company originating from the brewery industry. In 1889 a 
consortia of investors and brewers founded the company Stockholms Bryggerier, a 
merger of several breweries. In 1918 a decision was taken to centralize laboratories 
located in several small breweries within the brewery group of Stockholms Bryggerier 
into a large central laboratory, Centrallaboratoriet. Initially it’s primary function was to 
monitor the beer production, but about 10 years later it became more focused on 
systematic research on research methods, production methods and alternative uses of 
raw materials others than for beer brewing, e.g. vitamins and proteins derived from 
yeast, production of malt extract for beer production, and enzymes for other industries 
such as textiles and bakeries. 
A Danish brewery De Forenede Bryggerier, established in 1931 a daughter company in 
Malmö named Kärnbolaget for production and distribution of enzyme-based products 
for bakeries (e.g. flower) and binding compound for the moulding industry. In 1934 the 
Danes offered Stockholms Bryggerier to acquire Kärnbolaget in Malmö. Before long 
the deal was closed and activities moved to Stockholm. The acquisition of Kärnbolaget 
made the foundation of Kabi and the application of brewery competencies in other 
related industries. Kärnbolaget became an independent subsidiary to Stockholms 
Bryggerier. By 1945 Kärnbolaget had developed penicillin and in the following second 
part of the 1940s Kärnbolaget expanded R&D activities in penicillin and antibiotics. 
1951 Kärnbolaget Aktiebolag Biokemisk Industri changed name to Aktiebolaget Kabi 
and in the following year a production site for penicillin was taken into use in 
Strängnäs, including a microbiology laboratory. In 1971 Statsföretag acquired Kabi and 
in the following year Statsföretag restructured its pharmaceutical division into the Kabi-
Group, where Kabi became a subsidiary together with other related firms. In 1978 the 
                                                 
4 (Stankiewicz 1997) provides a thorough history and analysis of the beta-blocker development in Astra-
Hässle in particular and the international pharmaceutical industry in general. 
5 Historical data presented in the following section is compiled from a number of sources; Frankelius 
1999; Eliasson & Eliasson 2006; Nilsson & Norell 1997; Eifrém, Rössel, & Kumlin 2000; Waluszewski 
2004; Dolk & Sandström 2005; Kemivärlden Biotech med Kemisk Tidskrif 2001; Läkemedelsvärlden 
2001; Läkemedelsvärlden 2002; www.pfizer.se 2007; www.swedenbio.org 2007; wikipedia.org 
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company changed name to KabiVitrum and signs the first gene-technology based 
industrial contract with Genentech. Genentech developed human growth hormone based 
on its DNA-technology. KabiVitrum financed the R&D and Genetech transferred 
knowledge to KabiVitrum. Genentech was a newly established CRO, which offered 
R&D services based on its new DNA-technology. As a result of increasing focus on 
DNA-technology, KabiVitrum and Statsföretag AB established a new company 
KabiGen AB, which became the first DNA-technology based company in Scandinavia.  
In 1985/86 KabiVitrum faced major financial losses. Discussion flourished about to 
close down the firm. On of the main owners, Volvo, had built a conglomerate and 
wanted to focus on their core businesses. The second main owner, the Swedish 
Government, also planned to sell its shares. Both were focusing on finding a partner to 
merge with KabiVitrum. Growth was on top of the agenda to increase the competitive 
advantage of the company.  
The other part of the emerging pharmaceutical company, Pharmacia, was established in 
1911. It moved to Uppsala in 1951 and started to develop filtering and selection 
technologies in informal collaboration with Uppsala University. This technology 
became the foundation of biotechnology within Pharmacia. 
In 1990, Kabi and Pharmacia merged and formed KabiPharmacia. After acquiring three 
pharmaceutical companies the company changed name to Pharmacia in 1993. Figure 1 
exhibits Pharmacia’s Swedish genealogy and Appendix 2 exhibits more details about its 
history.  
2.4 Pharmacia’s M&A history 
Management and board members in the newly formed Pharmacia found it too small to 
grow organically, despite previous mergers and acquisitions of Italian companies. 
Pharmacia initially was looking for a collaboration partner (primarily for marketing and 
distribution in the US) rather than a merger. However, a concurrent international wave 
of mergers in the industry increased the threat from large competitors to increase market 
shares and attract skilled people from Pharmacia. Pharmacia’s pipeline was to deliver 
several new products and it was decided that the company needed more resources and 
market channels for the US market.  
At the time of the merger with Pharmacia in 1995, Upjohn was in a spiral of negative 
development, which was an important reason why the merger was executed; expiring 
patents, huge cash flow spent on a massive but non-productive project portfolio, and no 
new block busters in the pipeline (Stankiewicz 1997). To get out of  such a negative 
spiral either a  generative or a harvesting strategy may be pursued (Stankiewicz 1997). 
The former means that firms invest in in-house R&D and stay innovative through 
creativity. The latter refers to exploitation and commercialization of results from 
previous R&D projects. Pharmacia, following a generative strategy, for several decades 
had developed R&D projects in-house combined with acquisitions of external R&D- 
organisations. In the 1990s Pharmacia was expected to move into a combination of 
generative and harvesting strategy, reaping the fruit of long-term R&D investments. 
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Figure 1 Pharmacia Swedish Genealogy 
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However, Pharmacia needed resources, especially financial resources, competencies in 
structural chemistry to complement its focus on biotechnology and market penetration, 
for undertaking a full-scale exploitation and marketing activities. Upjohn, on the other 
hand, could offer the extra resources needed by Pharmacia but, as was revealed after the 
merger, did not match Pharmacia’s R&D project portfolio with a corresponding quality 
of project pipeline. However, to accomplish an expected combined generative and 
harvesting strategy, Pharmacia and Upjohn merged in 1995. 
From being completely controlled by Swedish shareholders, the share of Swedish 
ownership falls down to 20% in 1996. Critical voices argue (e.g. Biotech Sweden 2004; 
Dagens Industri 2004; Ny Teknik 2004) that the merger conditions for Pharmacia were 
less beneficial than for Upjohn and that the average pricing of US pharmaceutical 
companies was higher than for Swedish firm. Hence, US shareholders could buy a large 
stake of Pharmacia for less money. In addition, the R&D portfolio of Upjohn appeared 
to be less valuable than stated before the merger. In fact, the product portfolio consisting 
of products in pipeline and launched products of Pharmacia & Upjohn is primarily 
based on the output of Pharmacia’s R&D. Despite of this fact, after the merger R&D 
activities were transferred to the US and in 1997 also the Pharmacia & Upjohn 
headquarters moves from London to the US.  
Initially R&D activities were planned to expand in Sweden, but R&D activities in 
Uppsala closed down shortly after the merger. Protein substance ‘Refacto’ was sold to 
Wyeth and half of the instrument division of former Pharmacia established in 1969, 
Pharmacia Biotech, was acquired by the UK company Amersham International. The 
new company was named Amersham Pharmacia Biotech. 
In 1999 Pharmacia & Upjohn merged with the US pharmaceutical company Monsanto 
and changed name to Pharmacia Corporation. Swedish government, holding 14% of the 
shares after the IPO in 1994 and 7% of the shares after the merger with Upjohn in 1995, 
sold the rest of its shares. The total share of Swedish ownership fell to 9%. Expansion 
of R&D activities in Sweden was completely abandoned and R&D started to be 
reallocated to the US.  
Until the acquisition by Pfizer in 2003 further divestments took place; the rest of the 
shares in Amersham Pharmacia Biotech and Biovitrum. After Pfizer’s acquisition the 
share of Swedish ownership fell down to 4% and there were no more Swedish board 
members or managers. 
Pharmacia & Upjohn planned to close down the facilities in Helsingborg and move the 
production of Nicorette to Puerto Rico. Subsequently, these plans were abandoned by 
Pfizer, thereby keeping the production and labour force of around 1000 people in 
Helsingborg. Moreover, Pharmacia & Upjohn plans for closing down in Stockholm and 
Strängnäs were also abandoned. However, new production facilities in Uppsala, ordered 
by Pharmacia-Upjohn, were not being used. In 2004 Pfizer had about 3000 employees 
in Sweden, located in Helsingborg, Stockholm, and Strängnäs (out of 120.000 
employees and 80 facilities worldwide). In the time period 2003-2006 Pfizer undertook 
further divestments and by 2006 all sites in Uppsala had been sold and closed down. 
The only exception was investments made in at site in Strängnäs. In 2005 the number of 
employees is about 2500, further reduced to about 1300 in 2006, all in production or 
administration. Activities based on pharmaceutical R&D, in other words, are no longer 
part of Pfizer’s Swedish operations. 
  10
3 Pharmacia and Astra compared: The role of 
ownership and strategic intent6 
The M&A histories of Pharmacia and Astra clearly represent two opposite cases. We 
identify two inter-related causes behind their differences: i) control based on a 
combination of break-through rules and on shares with differentiated votes, and ii) 
short- vs. long-term perspectives of the investors. 
Control:  Before the exit of its two main owners, Pharmacia considered acquiring 
another pharmaceutical company, as was the upcoming trend in the industry in the 
beginning of the 1990s. However, the exit of the main shareholders in 1993-1994 
suddenly put Pharmacia in a much more defensive position. In 1993 the state acquires 
Volvo’s share of Pharmacia and becomes the sole main owner. In the following year 
Pharmacia is divested through an IPO and the state retains 14% of the shares and 12% 
of the votes, enabled by the existence of shares of differentiated votes. Although the 
stake held by the state enabled it to control the company based on the break-through 
rules at a limit of 90%, the state had communicated its strategy to divest its controlling 
share of the company. Hence, from being in position of evaluating acquisition targets, 
Pharmacia found itself in the opposite role of becoming a potential acquisition target. 
The exit of the main shareholders resulted in loss of clear ownership and sources of 
financing. As a result, Pharmacia found itself in a weak position in its own subsequent 
negotiations with Upjohn, where the Swedish government retained only 7% of the 
shares and thereby lost its control of the company. Astra, on the other hand, despite 
being listed on the stock exchange as early as 1955, benefited from having Investor AB 
controlled by the Wallenberg family as a major shareholder, taking a long-term 
perspective on Astra. In contrast to the conditions faced by Pharmacia, Astra would not 
become an acquisition target without the consent of Investor AB, the decisive influence 
of which was based on shares of differentiated votes and Swedish break-through rules at 
a limit of 90%. 
Sweden has had shares of differentiated votes for around 80 years, and Scandinavian 
firms still today tend to use dual class shares more frequently than their European 
counterparts (Bennedsen et al. 2007). The other control mechanism, break-through 
rules, imply that when at least 90% of all shares are acquired by an investor, the 
investor has the rights to acquire the remaining 10% without the possibility of any legal 
intervention by the remaining shareholders. In other words, hostile takeovers are not an 
alternative if a long-term investor holds more than 10% of the shares. In the case of 
Astra, the former mechanism played a crucial role combined with the ownership of 
shares with differentiated votes to gain influence on decisions taken in the company, 
although not to an extent where majority stake was obtained. In the case of Pharmacia, 
the main owners communicated their interest of not taking  advantage of any of the 
mechanisms at hand. 
In the majority of its investments, Investor holds more than 10% of the shares to be able 
to benefit from the Swedish shareholder legislation. Until 1998, the investment in Astra 
was not an exception. Before the merger between Astra and Zeneca in 1998, Investor 
                                                 
6 This chapter is partly based on interviews with Mats Petterson (CEO of Biovitrum AB and former CEO 
of Pharmacia), Håkan Mogren (former CEO of Astra, now Investor), Staffan Ternby (communication 
director of Astra) and Erik Belfrage (advisor to the chairman of Investor). 
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owned 11% of the so-called A-shares, shares with differentiated votes of a factor 10:1. 
However, since the merger with Zeneca, the shares are no longer differentiated in votes. 
As consequence, Investor now holds only about 3,4% of the capital and the votes in 
AstraZeneca, but nevertheless holds 3 out 12 of the board members. 
Long-term investment perspectives: Closely related to the control structure is the long-
term perspective of the investors. Differences in these perspectives were already 
reflected in efforts spent on preparing the shift into multinational ownership. The 
transition was prepared significantly differently in the two cases, not least in terms of 
efforts spent on searching for, evaluating and negotiating with potential partners. While 
Astra spent more than two years to prepare the partnership, Pharmacia merely spent 
roughly 6 months. For Astra, the merger clearly appears to have been aligned with the 
long-term strategy. Particular attention was paid to finding a partner matching as 
perfectly as possible the targeted aims and visions of Astra’s owners and management. 
Pharmacia, on the other hand, was under pressure to quickly find a partner to avoid 
being target for a hostile take-over. The main reasons were financial constraints for 
R&D funding and unclear ownership after the sudden exit of the two main shareholders 
of the Swedish government and Volvo. 
There is an ongoing debate that these control mechanisms, disproportional ownership in 
comparison to the share of cash flow, a) impede takeovers and thereby the market for 
corporate control, and b) the contractual freedom to decide the ownership structures 
(Bennedsen, Junge, Jacobsen, Nielsen, & Jespersen 2007). We learn from the control 
mechanisms and the investment perspectives discussed above, that in the present case, 
break-through rules and shares with differentiated votes enable investors to take a long-
term perspective on the involvement in firms. Without the control mechanisms, there is 
a risk of hostile take-overs would unless an investor acquires more than 50% of a firm 
and, hence, reduces its ability to spread risks in a higher number of investment objects. 
Also, firms may benefit from long-term perspective investors since they probably have 
a higher commitment even when firms invested in face financial downturns and requires 
additional investments.  
In a recent study on the effect of disproportionate ownership structures in comparison to 
income rights, Bennedsen et al (Bennedsen, Junge, Jacobsen, Nielsen, & Jespersen 
2007) study listed firms in 13 European countries and focus in particular on the 
disproportional ownership structures of Scandinavian firms. They claim that, in general, 
firms employing control mechanisms do not accomplish better economic performance 
measured as market to book ratio, return on assets, sales growth and employment 
growth. However, the pharmaceutical industry is an exception, where firms seem to 
generally achieve higher performance than for firms in other industries, with or without 
employment of control rights. The results indicate in particular increasing return on 
assets for pharmaceutical firms when employing disproportional ownership structures 
(ibid.). Further, negative effects on firm value do not seem to be driven by dual class 
share but by other control mechanisms, in particular pyramidal ownership structures. 
To summarize, innovation processes in the pharmaceutical industry requires long-term 
planning and commitments. Therefore pharmaceutical companies, derive considerable 
advantages from having owners taking a long-term view on their investment. To induce 
that long-term perspective investors need the possibility to control their investments and 
thereby secure the rights to future potential returns. In other words, a causal cascade 
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links control rights, via investment perspectives, to long-term commitments and 
strategies for the company. In the case of the Swedish pharmaceutical industry, 
Pharmacia’s story exemplifies that the mere formal availability of these control right in 
national legislation by itself will make no difference if they are not mobilised by owners 
with long-term commitments to the company. In Astra’s case, on the other hand, the 
combination of break-through rules and shares with differentiated votes reinforced a 
long-term perspective on part of a stable owner configuration, leading them towards 
stronger strategic attention to the merger with Zeneca. In turn, that secured a much 
stronger post-merger contribution from Astra to the Swedish economy.  
4 Tracing the transformation into post-Pharmacia 
activities 
Producing a comprehensive mapping of Pharmacia’s industrial legacy we establish the 
extent to which activities discontinued within Pharmacia by 2005 were substituted 
outside Pharmacia by new firms, in the form of start-ups, spin-offs or divestments, 
jointly referred to as Pharmacia derivatives. Extensive archival data was collected on 
firms qualifying as derivatives from Pharmacia. For identification of firms, we rely 
largely on previous studies (Nilsson & Norell 1997; Vinnova 2005; Eifrém 2000)  
supplementing with a few additional firms identified through press clippings, industry 
reviews, and on information on each firm in the industry, such as annual reports, 
homepages, and press releases. Along with few earlier small studies, we also record job 
creation/losses within Pharmacia and its derivatives. However, we differ from previous 
studies by updating data until 2006 for a more extensive set of firms and by categorising 
all Pharmacia derivatives on a combination of five dimensions:  
i) organisational form of each derivative, distinguishing between: a) 
divestments, b) spin-offs and c)start-ups 
ii) the origin of the derivative in each of Pharmacia’s three lines of business: 
Pharmaceuticals, Diagnostics and Instruments 
iii) domestic vs. foreign ownership of each derivative   
iv) whether each derivative was  formed before or after the merger with Upjohn 
in 1995  
v) job creation/loss over a ten-year period 
4.1 Previous studies 
The literature offers two opposing views on the Pharmacia legacy. (Eliasson & Eliasson 
2006), discuss whether large firms are more efficient in commercialising new 
technologies than new entrepreneurial firms. They propose a ‘Shake Loose Hypothesis’, 
arguing that resources set free from the dismantling of Pharmacia have been better 
allocated in new firms more capable of achieving commercial success. Without building 
on systematic statistical evidence, they conclude in favour of a positive effect of the 
restructuring of Pharmacia, arguing that the positive effects are still to be seen. 
The second view, (Waluszewski 2004) confronts the generally positive assessment of 
the Pharmacia legacy, as reflected not only in (Eliasson & Eliasson 2006) but also in a 
press release from Uppsala’s regional chamber of commerce presenting the downsizing 
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of Pharmacia activities as the basis for the emergence of the 140 firms constituting the 
local bio-cluster. However, the majority of these firms, Waluszewski argues, have 
grown out of established and stable industrial and academic units rather than growing 
out of resources set free by the downsizing of Pharmacia. Most of the life science and 
biotech firms of this region, she argues, were established before the restructuring of 
Pharmacia began in 1995, and they grew out of four organisations in particular: i) 
Pharmacia Biotech (now GE Healthcare), ii) Pharmacia Diagnostics (now PhaDia AB), 
iii) Uppsala University and iv) the University of Agriculture (Waluszewski 2004).  
From the list of 140 firms (Waluszewski 2004) identifies 70 units with various types of 
Pharmacia affiliations, but finds that most of them do not operate in businesses relating 
to Pharmacia’s former core areas. Adding the latter criterion brings Waluszewski’s list 
of Pharmacia-related firms down to 20-25 units.    
4.2 Method for identifying post-Pharmacia activities 
We record spin-offs and divestments from Pharmacia for the entire period from 1969 
until 2005. For the period 1990 until 2005 we also record start-ups, identified as 
founded by previous Pharmacia-employees. We do not confine firms to a particular 
geographic region but record firms situated all over Sweden. We delimit the study to 
Swedish firms related to Pharmacia. By “being related” we mean that firms are founded 
either as i) spin-offs (emerging from or building directly on the results of existing 
activities within Pharmacia, e.g. new R&D results or technologies), ii) as divestments 
(parts of existing activities that are separated and sold off), or new start-ups (stand-
alone firms not emerging from existing activities, but from previous Pharmacia 
employees). Further, we apply the distinction used by (Waluszewski 2004) between 
firms originating from different entities of Pharmacia. By following this distinction of 
origin, we may connect different types of Pharmacia activities with corresponding 
effects on the formation of new firms. That enables us to assess whether the general 
effect of the restructuring may be derived from Pharmacia in general or specific parts of 
activities. 
Identification of firms has been made through the public database of Bolagsverket 
(www.bolagsverket.se), official Swedish company registry. Firm specific data were 
sourced in the private database of Affärsdata (www.ad.se), which collects data from 
annual reports supplied by Bolagsverket. 
4.3 Findings 
We identify a total of 76 Pharmacia derivatives (see Table A1, A2 and A3 in Appendix 
3) still operating in 2005, at that time employing 4.999 people. Of this employment 
3.147 (63%) is found in foreign controlled firms.  
Of the 4.999 employees in 2005, a total of 731 are employed in firms spun-off, divested 
or started up before the 1995 merger with Upjohn, hence being unrelated to the merger 
and the subsequent dismantling of Pharmacia. Consequently the net substitutional 
employment by Pharmacia derivatives generated subsequent to the merger comes to 
4.268 employees in 43 firms, equivalent to 66% of Pharmacia’s size as per 1995 of 
about 6.500.   
The 4.268 jobs created by post merger derivatives are classified on two dimensions in 
Table 1. Vertically derivatives are distinguished by their origin in Pharmacia’s three 
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main product divisions, horizontally by the organisational form of the derivative.  The 9 
cells give corner percentage share of the aggregate employment of these 43 derivatives 
as per 2005.  
Turning first to spin-offs, their employment of 364 compares unfavourably with the 664 
jobs created by pre-merger spin-offs (see Table A1 in Appendix 3), confirming previous 
observations by (Waluszewski 2004)  
By far the highest number of employees is recorded for divestments made as part of the 
downsizing after 1995, resulting primarily in five large units, of which four are owned 
and controlled by foreign firms. In total 3.837 employees are found in divested firms, 
out of which 3.147 are employees by foreign owned firms. 
Start-ups, finally, play a microscopic role as derivatives from Pharmacia. Only 67 jobs, 
1,6% of all employment in Pharmacia derivatives, fall in this category. 
  
Table 1 Distribution of employment in Pharmacia post-merger derivatives (1995-2005) 
by origin in Pharmacia's divisions and by organisational form. Corner 
percentage shares of all employment (4268) as per 2005 
 
Organisational form of derivative  Origin in 
Pharmacia division Divestment Spin-off Start-up Total 
Pharmaceuticals 1786 (41,8%) 310 (7,3%) 0 (0,0%) 2096 (49,1%) 
Diagnostics  476 (11,2%) 0 (0%) 14 (0,3%) 490 (11,5%) 
Instruments 1575 (36,9%) 54 (1,3%) 0 (0,0%) 1629 (38,2%) 
Unknown 0 (0,0%) 0 (0,0%) 53 (1,2%) 53 (1,2%) 
Total 3837 (89,9%) 364 (8,5%) 67 (1,6%) 4268 (100%) 
Source: ScanBit 
 
Turning to the breakdown by product areas, all former Pharmacia activities in 
diagnostics and instruments have been fully divested or spun-off, by 2005 accounting 
for almost all the 490 and 1629 jobs recorded for these product areas as shown in Figure 
2. Compared to Pharmacia-internal employment in 1995, these 2005 levels represent in 
diagnostics an increase from 450 to 490. For instruments the increase is steeper from 
1.050 to 1.629. Employment growth has occurred primarily in the two foreign owned 
firms of GE HealthCare and PhaDia. 
For pharmaceuticals the same 1995-2005 comparison comes out less favourably. The 
initial 5.000 Pharmacia-internal employees have been reduced to 2.096 employees in 
firms derived from Pharmacia and 2.500 employees remaining in Pfizer in 2005. Out of 
the 2.500 employees remaining in Pfizer in 2005, about 1.250 are found in the 
Stockholm-Uppsala region, headquarter staff accounting for 450 employees. About 
1.000 are located in Helsingborg and around 400 in Strängnäs. While Pfizer invests in 
the site in Strängnäs, manufacturing in Stockholm is scheduled to shut down by 2008, 
reducing the number of employees by 550. Activities will be allocated to other sites 
within Pfizer outside Sweden. Since our 2005 figures were gathered, the laboratory in 
Uppsala has been closed reducing the number of employees by 100, the manufacturing 
site in Uppsala is sold to the Indian company Kemwell, and the production facilities and 
manufacturing of Nicorette in Helsingborg with approximately 1.000 employees is to 
sold Johnson & Johnson. Consequently, all sites in Uppsala are by 2006 sold off. GE 
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Healthcare acquired Biacore AB in 2006 and the Swedish part of Pfizer now consists of 
the headquarters in Stockholm, the production facilities in Strängnäs and the site in 
Stockholm, which will be shut down in 2008. The reductions bring the total of Pfizer 
employees to 1.300 employees in 2006. 
To see the context for the 67 jobs identified in Table 1 generated in start-ups, we 
compare them in Table 2 with the job creation of pre-merger start-ups. Distinguishing 
between start-ups established before and after 1995 Table 2 shows 85 employees for 
pre-1995 start-ups, and exactly the same number for start-ups begun after 1995. Data 
are missing for a few firms, but they total employment is estimated to 10-20 jobs.  
 
Figure 2  Substitutional effects for three divisions within Pharmacia 
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Moreover, Table 2 also records firms started up by academics based on university 
research for which collaboration with Pharmacia research played a significant role. 
University start-ups before 1995 in 2005accounts for 184 employees, while start-ups 
from 1995 and onwards only register 59 employees (Table 2).  
Table 2 Pharmacia-related start-ups and university start-ups growing out of R&D collaboration 
with Pharmacia. Number of firms and their 2005 employment, separate for firms started 
up before and after 1995. 
 
  Pharmacia related start-ups University start-ups 
Industry classification -1994 1995- -1994 1995- 
  Firms Empl.* Firms Empl.* Firms Empl.* Firms Empl.* 
Manufacturing 1 8    3 169    
Wholesale 1              
Computer software 2 41            
R&D 5 8 6 64    3 59
Consultancy and services 8 7 5 3        
Medical services 1              
Unknown industry 7 21 2  1 15    
Closed down / unident. 9  9      2  
Total 34 85 22 67 4 184 5 59
 * Employment figures as of 2005     
Source: ScanBit 
Hence, for the 1995-2005 period we find an overall substitution effect in Pharmacia 
derivatives of 4.268 jobs.  As compared to the domestic pre-acquisition employment in 
Pharmacia of app. 6.500, this amounts to a gross substitution of 66%. However, 
applying the above distinctions, we are able offer a more multifaceted mapping of this 
substitution, which brings out three important conclusions:   
• First, only about 49% of the substitution refers to pharma-related activities, 
representing a major shift in the proportions compared to the original activities of 
Pharmacia, in which pharmaceuticals by far was the major field of activity (77%). 
As compared particularly to instruments, the business of pharmaceuticals appears to 
be considerably less amenable for restructuring.  
• Second, actual substitution partly conforms to the argument of Eliasson’s “shake-
loose hypothesis” (Eliasson & Eliasson 2006) in that incoming foreign investments 
into existing units have played a more important role, whereas our findings indicate 
a much weaker role for new entrepreneurial start-ups amongst Pharmacia 
derivatives. Substitution to an overwhelming extent takes the more “orderly” form 
of divestments, carried out by Pharmacia while it was still fully operative. 90% of 
all observed substitution comes about as divestments. That is, in the case of 
Pharmacia and the Swedish pharmaceutical industry, it appears that divestments of 
complete business units from an existing incumbent are more viable than in 
assembling new business units made available from a shake-loose effect.  
• Third, the Pharmacia legacy exhibits only six biotech start-ups in the period 1995-
2005 with in total 64 employees, 36 of which are in Orexo accounts. Therefore, 
although the Stockholm-Uppsala biotech cluster expanded concurrently with the 
major reduction in Pharmacia’s activities, the two processes appear to have been 
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largely disconnected from each other. Start-ups appear to a higher extent in other 
industries taken together, which tend to be characterized by low entry barriers and 
by subsequent low levels of employment growth. 
 
5 Assessing the re-combinatorial capacity of the 
bio-pharmaceutical RIS of Stockholm-Uppsala 
The above findings give rise to the second set of issues considered in this paper:  If a 
substantial pool of managerial talent for pharma-related business was set free by the 
termination of Pharmacia, why did it not re-emerge in the form of manager-founders of 
new biotech firms? The ability to facilitate such recombination and redirection of 
managerial talent has been argued to be an important dimension of a Regional System 
of Innovation (RIS) (Coenen, Moodysson, & Asheim 2004; Dalum et al. 1999; Kenney 
& Von Burg 2001; Lawson 1999; Niosi & Banik 2005).  
This section examines effects of such recombinatorial mechanisms on the emergence of 
new biotech firms in Scandinavian generally, and in the Stockholm-Uppsala region 
specifically. For this analysis we draw on unique micro-level data extracted from the 
SCANBIT database at CBS, which offers current and historical information on a large 
variety of attributes of all 117 biotech Drug Discovery Firms (DDFs) which until 2006 
have operated in Sweden, Denmark, and Norway. It should be noted that our data and 
analyses, consequently, are restricted to biotech Drug Discovery Firms, not including 
e.g. larger integrated pharmaceutical firms or firms specialized in diagnostics7.  
5.1 Manager-founders and their prior firms 
As a first step we examine the incidence of manager-founders in Scandinavian DDFs 
and the extent to which they become founders subsequent to a close down of their prior 
companies.  
The 117 Scandinavian DDFs were established by a total of 262 founders. Table 3, 
column d identifies a total of 111 founders who exited from managerial positions in 
industry to found a DDF.  
More fine-grained breakdown of the data, not reported here, shows that 41% of these 
transitions came directly out of pharmaceutical firms, while another 28% came out of 
other DDFs. The latter in many cases were made out of first-generation DDFs founded  
                                                 
7 For a presentation of the SCANBIT database se (Valentin, Dahlgren, & Jensen 2006) 
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Table 3.  Founders of Scandinavian DDFs by type and by  region of their organizational 
affiliation prior to star-up  
 A B C D E 
Location of   
founder’s prior  
Organization  
Founders 
from public 
research 
org’s 
Manager-
founders 
Manager-
founders as 
%share of all 
founders 
Manager-
founders from 
closed down 
firms 
d as %   
of all 
founders 
Stockholm-Uppsala 45 18 28.6% 2 3.2% 
Copenhagen 29 59 67.0% 11 12.5% 
Other Scandinavian 67 22 24.7% 2 2.2% 
Outside Scandinavia 10 12 54.5% 2 9.1% 
All 151 111 42.4% 17 6.5% 
Source: Scanbit 
 
by former pharma-managers. Together these direct and indirect routes of manager-to-
founder transitions out of established pharmaceutical firms reveal the critical role of 
incumbents in the emergence of new biotech firms in Scandinavia.  
However, notably only 17 manager-founders came from firms which had closed down 
before 2005, equivalent to 6.5% of all founders and to 15% of all manager-founders. 
Manager-founders, in other words, to an overwhelming extent exit from fully 
operational firms, only in rare cases establishing their new firm reactively to the 
shutdown of his/her prior firm. 
An explanation for this pattern may be pieced together from different strains of 
literatures: A bio-start-up is a complex process, requiring highly diverse elements to be 
brought together (Casper, Jong, & Murray 2004;MacAulay & Boyce 2006;McKelvey 
1998). From a managerial position in an incumbent firm you are in a better position to 
search for and to assess these elements. You also are given the possibility to wait for the 
“right moment”, meaning the point of confluence of all those elements which factor into 
successful entrepreneurship (Shane 2003). Bio-ventures arguably are acutely sensitive 
in this respect, because they are particularly demanding in terms of integrative 
capabilities (Pisano 1996;Pisano 2006). This argument, in turn, is consistent with 
studies unpacking the emergence of the key entrepreneurial concept on which a high-
tech start-up is made. Rather than emerging as an abrupt flash of entrepreneurial 
creativity this concept co-evolves with the gradual formation of the founder team 
(Beckman 2006). Together these literatures provide the argument that for the start-up of 
new DDFs a position within a fully operating incumbent offers possibilities for search 
and combination of entrepreneurial opportunities superior to those available to laid-off 
managers trying to start a new firm as a reaction to the close down of their prior 
employer.  
Still, this argument addresses the overall low incidence of founder-managers from 
closed down incumbents amongst Scandinavian DDFs. Table 3 also gives a regional 
break-down, recording managers by the location of their organizational affiliation 
immediately prior to the start-up. In most cases that is identical to the region in which 
the new firm is founded, of course except for the 22 founders from outside Scandinavia. 
Column e gives the regional  breakdown for shares of manager-founders from closed 
down firms as a percentage of all founders. The share of 3.2% in the S-U region is half 
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of the overall average of 6.5% for Scandinavia as a whole, and a quarter of the 
Copenhagen (CPH)level of 12.5%. The opposite relationship could have been expected. 
S-U has seen Scandinavia’s largest downsizing of a pharma incumbent, whereas the 
CPH region has no history of closed down or downsizing of its pharmaceutical 
incumbents.  
Moreover, the low mobilization of managers from closed down incumbents appears to 
be part of a broader limitation on part of the S-U region to recruit managerial 
experienced talent for bio-entrepreneurship. Table 3 groups founders by the type of 
organisation from which they exited when starting up the DDF. A distinction is made 
between prior affiliations with Public Research Organizations (PROs, predominantly 
meaning universities) or with private firms. The latter manager-founders constitute 67% 
of all founders from the CPH region but a share less than half that level, 28.6%, in the 
S-U region. To a remarkable extent, DDFs in the S-U region have been founded by 
university scientists, constituting close to ¾ of all DDF founders in the region. These 
findings indicate significant differences between the two regions in terms of their 
efficacy in recombining local managerial talent into new bio-entrepreneurship. The next 
section looks into possible causes for this difference.  
5.2 Patterns of early venture capital financing of DDFs 
Theory 
Clusters of high-tech firms to a large extent emerge and develop through the ability of 
its RIS to recombine critical resources into new configurations (Audretsch 2001;Nilsson 
2000;Niosi & Banik 2005). A particularly critical role is played by venture capital 
(Champenois, Engel, & Heneric Oliver 2006;Zucker, Darby, & Armstrong 2002). 
Newly established firms are especially vulnerable in this respect, and rely strongly on 
local VC, whereas more mature firms to higher extent use non-local sources (Powell et 
al. 2005) 
The ability of biotech firms to mobilize venture capital depends not only on the strength 
of their research or initial patent portfolio. The presence of acknowledged managerial 
expertise amongst founders and managers seems to be equally important, not only for 
defining the direction of the firm and for keeping it on course (Feldman, Valentin, & 
Yoon 2007), but also for mobilizing venture capital in the first place. Empirical 
confirmations of this relationship articulates it as the one-way relationship whereby 
managerial experience is seen as the attractor of venture capital (Beckman, Burton, & 
O'Reilly 2006; Depaauw 2007). In many cases this is undoubtedly the direction of the 
relationship. But particularly in emerging clusters the opposite direction probably is also 
at play, i.e. experienced managers in established firms being reluctant to undertake the 
manager-to-founder transition if it remains uncertain whether local venture capital will 
be available in required volume and timing.  
There is a chicken-egg aspect in this relationship between VC and experienced 
managerial talent (Valentin, Dahlgren, & Jensen 2006). In practical terms they seem to 
be resolved through the types of iterations identified by (Beckman 2006) as critical for 
the emergence of a high-tech start-up (Baum & Silverman 2004). In turn, that makes it a 
crucial issue for the emergence of biotech clusters whether venture capital is prepared to 
move in early and with sufficient financing in the early stages of a bio-venture.  
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From this perspective this section 
examines the Stockholm-Uppsala region in 
terms of the patterns of the early venture 
capital investments in DDFs. To see the S-
U pattern in context it is compared with the 
CPH region and with an aggregate of other 
smaller Scandinavian bio-regions.  
Beginning descriptively Fig. 3 presents the 
share of firms obtaining a first financing 
round within the first year of it’s 
establishment. CPH firms split almost 50-
50 in this respect. In the S-U region more 
than 2/3 of newly established DDFs go 
through their first year without undertaking 
their first round.   
To study the volume of VC financing we 
build a model comparing amounts raised 
by DDFs in Stockholm-Uppsala and other Scandinavian regions against the level of 
CPH separately for first and second-third financing rounds, and for rounds above the 
third round.  
Method  
The SCANBIT data we use form an unbalanced panel from 1997 to 2004. We follow 
the same firms and cannot assume the observations to be independently distributed 
across time. It is highly likely that some unobserved factor, such as personal and 
professional networks, affects the amount of the venture capital invested into a firm. 
There are several applicable methods for controlling for unobserved effects. Because of 
the small number of observations, we did not apply a first differencing approach. A 
fixed effects approach would be an obvious choice. But we found it to be inappropriate 
as one of our variable of primary interest, namely the regional location of the firms, is 
fixed. We would therefore not be able to study this particular variable in a fixed effects 
panel estimation. Assuming the unobserved effects have serial correlation effects on the 
error term and assuming the unobserved effect to be uncorrelated with the explanatory 
variables caused us to use a random effects model and therefore a generalized least 
square estimation technique.8      
Before doing the regressions we studied the shape of the dependent variable. The raw 
venture capital variable exhibited a log-normal like distributional shape and hence to be 
significantly right skewed. Taking the logarithm of the venture capital amount left us 
with a symmetric and bell-shaped dependent variable which may be studied using 
standard regression techniques. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test supported the assumption 
that the logarithm of the amount of venture capital is normally distributed. Additionally 
we used a cluster corrected method of estimating the standard errors and thereby 
controlling for intra firm correlations. This provides unbiased standard errors.  
                                                 
8 After settling with a random effects model, we used a Hausman test to see whether the estimates of the 
random effects model were substantially different from a fixed effects model. The Hausman test came out 
inconclusive which may be attributed to the small sample. 
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The primary variables of interest in our model are categorical. First the region in which 
the firm is situated which has three possible outcomes; CPH, Stockholm/Uppsala, and 
Other regions. Secondly, we introduce the number of the finance round which also have 
three possible outcomes; 1st round, 2nd/3rd Round, and beyond the 3rd round. We also 
inter-acted these variables giving us a total of 8 dummies with respect to these two 
variables. We use CPH and 1st round as the benchmark categories. The categorical 
variables and interaction terms was introduced step-wise with the region variable first, 
the number of finance rounds variable second, and finally their interaction terms. By 
using a Wald Chi-Square test on the parameter estimates, we compare to what extent we 
may conclude that biotech firms in particular regions have an advantage in the amounts 
of venture capital received going beyond the 1st round as well as in total.   
Findings  
Benchmarked against CPH, the level of first round financing in Table 4 for Stockholm-
Uppsala\s DDFs (a1) brings significant, negative estimates in all of models 2, 3, and 4.  
The estimate in model 4 of -1,34 indicates that S-U firms in this round on average 
generate 73% less than their CPH counterparts, when other variables are controlled for.  
Unsurprisingly, with strongly significant estimates, financing rounds 2-3 (a3) and 
subsequent rounds (a4) for all Scandinavia firms rise progressively higher than the first-
round CPH benchmark. Rounds above the 3rd round on average are 4 times higher than 
the first round.  
Separately the interactions a5-a8 are significant only in the case of a7, where the 
negative estimate shows second and third round financing in other regions to be well 
below the level of first round financing in CPH 
Table 5 presents Wald tests for differences in parameters and parameter compositions 
obtained in model 4. CPH estimates subtracted from S-U estimates remain insignificant 
when differences between rounds are tested separately, but obtains a negative estimate 
of -2.891 (significant at the 10% level) in calculation of the net difference for all rounds. 
I.e. when all rounds are considered together, DDFs in CPH are financed above the level 
observed for S-U firms, due primarily to the much higher amount mobilized by CPH 
firms in the first round. 
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Table 4: Determinants of VC amount, results of cluster corrected ordinary least square 
regressions  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Stockholm/Uppsala (a1) -0.796 ** -0.775 ** -1.340 **
[0.399] [0.392] [0.581]
Other Region (a2) -0.958 *** -0.900 ** -0.197
[0.370] [0.387] [0.479]
Finance Round 2/3 (a3) 1.219 *** 1.279 ***
[0.238] [0.353]
Beyond 3rd Finance Round (a4) 1.398 *** 1.605 ***
[0.378] [0.557]
Stockholm/Uppsala*Finance Round 2/3 (a5) 0.785
[0.650]
Stockholm/Uppsala*Beyond 3rd Finance Round (a6) 0.549
[0.777]
Other Region*Finance Round 2/3 (a7) -0.901 **
[0.440]
Other Region*Beyond 3rd Finance Round (a8) -1.281
[0.814]
Years until next round 0.175 0.234 0.267 0.205
[0.184] [0.183] [0.164] [0.164]
Outsourcing of R&D activities -0.085 -0.066 -0.007 0.033
[0.265] [0.270] [0.241] [0.256]
Quoted on Stock Exchange 1.342 *** 1.240 *** 0.915 ** 0.772
[0.465] [0.446] [0.465] [0.494]
Number of patents 0.056 0.014 0.033 0.040
[0.047] [0.051] [0.053] [0.058]
Age of the firm in years 0.067 *** 0.092 *** 0.070 *** 0.077 ***
[0.021] [0.026] [0.018] [0.018]
Small Molecules Biotechnology 0.181 0.136 0.301 0.315
[0.295] [0.283] [0.288] [0.287]
Constant 15.003 *** 15.254 *** 15.077 *** 15.591 ***
[0.934] [0.833] [0.821] [0.830]
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 194 194 194 194
Number of Firms 72 72 72 72
R-Square Within 0.064 0.082 0.253 0.296
R-Square Between 0.366 0.423 0.435 0.446
R-Square Overall 0.232 0.273 0.325 0.346
Wald Chi-Square 75.374 *** 89.964 *** 169.249 *** 234.917 ***
Sigma u 0.835 0.809 0.885 0.893
Sigma e 1.307 1.307 1.193 1.171
Rho 0.29 0.277 0.355 0.368
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, Numbers in square brackets are the associated standard deviations  
 
The positive and significant results for all subtractions of Other Regions from CPH 
indicate consistently higher financing across rounds for DDF in the CPH region. 
The analogous subtraction of Other Regions from Stockholm-Uppsala shows lower 
financing in Other Regions from 2-3 rounds onwards. First round financing, however, 
show a moderate bent in the opposite direction. For this first stage in the life of DDFs, 
Stockholm firms on the whole come out as being financed not only below the level of 
CPH, but also below the rest of Scandinavia. 
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Table 5: Wald test for differences in parameters and parameter compositions using 
model 4 results   
      
    Parameter equations Value Chi-Square   
      
Subtracting Copenhagen from Stockholm/Uppsala    
 2/3 Round a(3)-a(5) 0.494 0.290  
 Beyond 3rd Round a(4)-a(6) 1.057 0.750  
 Total a(1)-a(3)-a(4)+a(5)+a(6) -2.891 3.720 * 
      
Subtracting Other Regions from Copenhagen     
 2/3 Round a(3)-a(7) 2.180 8.920 *** 
 Beyond 3rd Round a(4)-a(8) 2.886 5.390 ** 
 Total a(2)-a(3)-a(4)+a(7)+a(8) 5.263 12.690 *** 
      
Subtracting Other Regions from Stockholm/Uppsala    
 First Round a(1)-a(2) -1.143 3.470 * 
 2/3 Round a(5)-a(7) 1.685 7.820 *** 
 Beyond 3rd Round a(6)-a(8) 1.829 5.190 ** 
  Total a(1)-a(2)+(a5)+(a6)-a(7)-a(8) 5.052 6.700 *** 
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01     
 
To summarise, a much smaller share of DDFs in S-U undertake a financing round 
during their first year of operations as compared to their CPH counterpart. When SU 
firms eventually obtain a first financing round it tends to generate comparatively small 
amounts. First round amounts on average are 73% below the level for CPH firms. 
Indeed S-U first round financing seems to be below the level also for DDFs in an 
aggregate of all other regions in Scandinavia.  
For the experienced manager contemplating the shift to founding a new firm the 
availability and sufficiency of first round financing arguable is the critical point. 
Availability and size of first round financing decides if the firms from early on will be 
able to progress at the speed required in the innovation races characterising this 
business. Again at this initial stage the availability of local VC is much more significant 
compared its role in later stages (Powell, White, Koput, & Owen-Smith 2005).  
Venture capital operates with fairly specialized reference to specific high-tech sectors 
{Avnimelech, 2006 2309 /id, so we have not reason to assume that our findings have 
general validity for S-U high-tech generally. But within the sector of bio-drug discovery 
firms our findings quite clearly indicate a poorer performance in the supply of venture 
capital for newly established firms in the S-U region.  
We suggest that this shortcoming is an important part of the reason why the S-U region 
has had a comparatively lower rate of manager-to-founder transitions and even lower 
rate for such transition for managers laid off from closed-down incumbents.  
In this sense findings from this section indicate a comparatively weaker RIS- 
performance in S-U in terms of the efficacy with which venture capital facilitates the 
recombination of experienced managerial expertise into the founder teams of new 
biotech firms. Most likely this is one of the causes for the paucity of DDF start-ups to 
have emerged as part of the out of the Pharmacia legacy. 
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6 Conclusions 
This study has demonstrated that Scandinavia’s new biotech firms to a considerable 
extent emerged as derivatives of large pharmaceutical firms. These “derivatives” take 
various organisational forms, of which we have reported on divestments, spin-outs and 
start-ups by manager-founders.  
Pharmacia/Pfizer generated derivatives primarily while being fully operative, and did so 
almost exclusively in the form of divestments and spin-outs, but very little in terms of 
manager-founder start-ups, particularly when the outcome is measured by job creation. 
This contrasts with the general pattern by which large pharmaceutical firms have 
supplied a substantial share of the transitions from manager to bio-founders. However, 
only few manager-founders undertook that transition reactively because their employer 
closed down. 
The losses from downsizing and discontinuing a leading pharmaceutical firm should not 
be downplayed by reference to the entrepreneurial opportunities it may set free. The 
specific example of Pharmacia’s legacy demonstrates that even in the heart of one of the 
most advanced economies these opportunities may fail to materialise. Recent theorising 
on the nature of high-tech entrepreneurship is consistent with the lessons from this 
example.  
Astra’s M&A history diverged so strongly from Pharmacia’s example primarily because 
it was controlled by investors taking a long-term perspective on their interests in the 
company. They used their influence to carefully prepare over several years a merger 
which would unfold consistently with their strategic vision. In turn this influence was 
based on the control rights offered by Swedish legislation in the form of break-through 
rules and shares with differentiated votes. Interviews conducted for this paper with 
Astra’s key owners clarified that without these control rights they would not have 
pursued this long-term strategy. 
Operating under the same national set of control rights, the Pharmacia case 
demonstrates that by itself this regulation does not guaranty that owners act out of long-
term interests. But our juxtaposition of the two cases has brought out that if investors 
are available with propensity for the longer view, then Swedish control rights also 
induces them to act accordingly, offering an inroad into multinational ownership 
fundamentally different from that exemplified by Pharmacia.   
Quite separately from the Pharmacia story the innovation system in the Stockholm-
Uppsala region performs notably weaker than its Copenhagen counterpart in terms of 
transforming pharma-managers to bio-founders. Since venture capital is recognised as a 
key mechanisms for connecting managerial talent to new entrepreneurial opportunities a 
comparison is made of venture financing of DDFs in the S-U region with that in CPH. 
A much larger share of S-U start-ups is shown to go through their first year without 
obtaining a first financing round. Furthermore, regressions allowing control for a 
number of firm and business cycle attributes, demonstrate that first rounds (regardless 
of their timing) generate remarkably lower amounts for DDFs in S-U compared not only 
to CPH, but also compared to an aggregate of all other Scandinavian regions. In this 
sense the innovation system in the S-U region has been comparatively poorer prepared 
for the recombinatorial challenges of transforming managerial talent from downsizing 
Pharmacia/Pfizer’s into new bio-founders.  
  25
The local presence in the CPH region of large pharma companies plays a role also for its 
stronger contribution of venture capital to emerging DDFs. Based on their long-term 
commitment to development of the region’s bio-capabilities CPH’s large 
pharmaceutical firms have set up venture finance activities as one of several ways in 
which they make managerial talent and resources available for new local biotech start-
ups.  
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APPENDIX 1 
 
 
A1 Concise history of AB Astra 
 
1904 Draco was founded in Lund. 
1913 AB Astra (or Aktiebolaget Astra Apotekarnas Kemiska Fabriker) was founded by the pharmacist 
Adolf Rising in Södertälje. 
1931 Initiates its first R&D activities. 
1934 Founds subsidiaries in Finland and Latvia, its first export markets. 
1939 Acquires Tika. 
1942 Acquires Hässle and forms the subsidiary Astra Hässle. 
1947 Forms an US subsidiary. 
1955 Listed on the Stockholm stock exchange. 
 Acquires Draco and forms the subsidiary Astra Draco. 
1979 Focuses on pharmaceutical activities, abandons other activities. 
1981 Builds manufacturing facilities and headquarters in US. 
1982 Signs agreement with Merck covering clinical trials, registration and marketing in the US of products 
resulting from Astra’s R&D. 
1986 Acquires Arcos and forms the subsidiary Astra Arcos. 
1987 Acquires 25% of Symbicom AB (est. 1984). 
1994 Forms a joint venture with Merck, Astra Merck Inc., focusing on marketing, sales and drug 
development. 
1995 Acquires all shares of Symbicom AB and incorporates it in Astra Hässle. 
1998 Astra Pharmaceuticals, combined by Astra Merck Inc. and Astra USA becomes the US subsidiary of 
Astra. 
1999 Merges with Zeneca Group PLC. 
 
 
 
A2 Concise history of Zeneca Group PLC 
 
1926 ICI – Imperial Chemical Industries – was founded as a merger of four British companies. 
1936 ICI initiates pharmaceutical R&D by forming a R&D organization in Blackley, UK, to synthesize 
medically active compounds. 
1957 ICI forms a separate Pharmaceuticals Division as a response to the rapid growth of its R&D 
activities. 
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1967 ICI establishes US office. 
1992 ICI PLC, UK, changes name on its US subsidiary (ICI Americas Inc. changed name to Zeneca Inc.) 
and concurrently creates a new US company. Zeneca comprises ICI’s bioscience businesses while 
the new company comprises its chemical businesses. 
1993 Zeneca Group PLS, UK, was founded as a spin-off from ICI, becoming a global bioscience 
company within pharmaceuticals, agricultural chemicals and specialty chemicals. 
1999 Merges with AB Astra. 
 
 
 
A3 Concise history of AstraZeneca 
 
1999 Headquarter located in London while R&D headquarters located in Södertälje (SE). 
Strategic review of R&D activities results in realignment of resources in UK and Sweden,  
and expansion in the US. Discovery organization will consist of about 3.500 people worldwide 
Development organization will consist of about 4.000 people mainly located in six major R&D sites 
in the US, UK and Sweden.  
36 manufacturing sites in 20 countries employ 12.500 people. Active bulk pharmaceuticals produced 
on 8 sites. $700 million invested in manufacturing facilities globally. Further investments are planned 
in Sweden, UK, Puerto Rico, France, and Germany. Marketing activities handled on 33 sites 
worldwide. 
AstraZeneca’s agrochemical business unit merge with Novartis’ crop protection and seeds business 
and forms a new company called Syngenta AG. 
2002 $557 million USD investments in R&D and production made in Sweden, UK and the US. 
11.000 R&D employees worldwide at 9 R&D sites in UK, the US, Sweden, Canada and India. 
12.500 employees engaged in formulation and delivery. 
32 manufacturing sites in 20 countries employing 15.000 people. Most important sites found in 
France. Germany, Puerto Rico, Sweden, UK, and the US, Australia, Italy, Japan 
New packaging sites in Puerto Rico, Sweden and UK. 
Active bulk pharmaceuticals mainly produced in UK, Sweden, France and Puerto Rico. 
Opens state-of-the-art R&D facilities in MA.,US, comprising 170 scientists. 
2003 Invests in new laboratory and office space in Boston comprising more than 100 scientists. 
2004 Opens state-of-the-art automated compound management facility in US as part of a $165 million 
investment in US R&D facilities. 
Out of 11.600 R&D employees globally, 5.100 are employed in Sweden. 
Main Swedish shareholder Investor AB reduces its share to 3,5% of the stocks. 
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Swedish firms within the group expand business: AstraZeneca (Mölndal), Astra Tech, Nobel 
Biocare and Mölnlycke.  
2005 Further investments in R&D in Sweden, UK and the US. 
Most important R&D unites are found in UK, Sweden (Lund, Mölndal and Södertälje), the US, 
Canada, and India. Additional R&D activities are also undertaken in France and Japan. 
27 manufacturing sites in 19 countries, Largest found in UK, Sweden (Snäckviken and Gärtuna, 
Södertälje), the US Australia, and France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Puerto Rico. 
Active bulk pharmaceuticals mainly produced in UK, Sweden, and France. 
 
2006 12.800 people employed in Sweden in R&D, manufacturing and marketing. 
A large share of AstraZeneca’s manufacturing takes place in Sweden, among others in the world’s 
largest tablet manufacturing site in Södertälje.  Swedish export accounts to 39 billion SEK in 2005. 
Operations (manufacturing and supply) worldwide employ 14.000 people in 19 countries, out of 
which 5.000 are employed in Sweden. 
Swedish R&D units are found in Mölndal, Lund and Södertälje. Production is located in Södertälje. 
Six of the 9 best selling AstraZeneca products are derived from Swedish R&D. 
Acquires the British biotech firm CAT. 
 
 
 
Figure A1 Astra Swedish Genealogy 
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A = Acquisition, M = Merger, S = Spin-off 
Dotted line indicates spin-off in an independent firm, solid line indicates integration of two or more independent firms, filled squares denotes firms still active. 
Source: Own figure 
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A4 Concise history of Pharmacia AB 
 
1877 Vitrum is founded. 
1889  Stockholms Bryggerier is founded. 
1911 Pharmacia is founded as a distributor of medical products. 
1913 Pharmacists lost exclusive rights to produce and distribute pharmaceuticals. Private companies were 
able to develop, manufacture and distribute pharmaceuticals. However, not until 1934 the Swedish 
government stated a law requiring pharmaceutical to be controlled and registered before market 
launch. 
1914 The Danish company Løvens Kemiska Fabrik establishes a subsidiary in Helsingborg, Leo. 
1918 Stockholms Bryggerier establishes Centrallaboratoriet. 
1919 Leo founds a development company, Ferrosan. 
1931 The Danish company De Forenede Bryggerier establishes a subsidiary in Malmö, Kärnbolaget. 
1934 Stockholms Bryggerier acquires Kärnbolaget. 
1939 Apotekarsocieteten establishes Apotekens Kompositionslaboratorium (ACO). 
1941 Recip is founded. 
1943 Stockholms Bryggerier and two other companies founds as a joint company, LKB-Produkter AB, 
focusing on R&D of instruments and chemicals. 
1947 Pharmacia launches Dextran, a blood substitute developed in collaboration with Uppsala University. 
1951 Kärnbolaget Aktiebolag Biokemisk Industri changes name to Aktiebolaget Kabi. 
Pharmacia moves to Uppsala. Development of filtering and selection technologies in informal 
collaboration with Uppsala University is the foundation of biotechnology within Pharmacia. 
1952 Kabi opens production site for penicillin in Strängnäs. 
1958 Kabi establishes its first foreign subsidiary, Deutsche Kabi GmbH, situated in München. 
1959 Kabi develops a competing product, Kabipastin, to be a produced by Ferrosan. 
Apotekarsocieteten acquires the majority of shares in Vitrum. Critique from the industry since 
Apotekarsocieteten was the monopoly of pharmacies. 
1961 Kabi establishes subsidiaries in Norway (A/S Kabi) and the UK (Kabi Pharmaceuticals Ltd.). 
1962 Kabi establishes an internal biochemical laboratory dedicated to find new substances for 
pharmaceutical development, primarily blood related products and peptide hormones. From the 
1940s until 1962 Kabi had a biochemical laboratory together with LKB using their competencies, a 
company later to be acquired by Pharmacia Biotech in 1985. 
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1964 Kabi acquires chemical/technical company AB Oxygenol and its daughter company Recip, in total 
110 employees (about ¼ of Kabi). Oxygenol had roots in Pharmacy “Elgen” established in 
Stockholm in 1908.  Recip was est. in 1942, focusing on synthetic substances for pharmaceutical 
treatment. 
Kabi collaborates with a number of scientific institutions as well as pharmaceutical companies. Kabi 
products were produces under license and in 17 countries and marketed by agents in 35 other 
countries. In total 75 products were sold on the Swedish market, whereof 25 stemmed from Recip. 
1965 Kabi opens new production facilities for blood plasma. 
 Kabi acquires Grummebolagen (consisting of six companies, the oldest est. 1841, producing 
cosmetics, soaps, shampoo, toothpaste, industrial cleaning products, and candles.) Oxygenol was 
later integrated in Grummebolagen. 
1966 Kabi was owned by Stockholms Bryggerier, which in 1964 decided to merge with another brewery, 
Pripp & Lyckholm. The merger was done in 1966 and the new company name was “Pripp-
Bryggerierna AB”. The number of brewery managers increased which led to that Kabi was sold to 
the Swedish Government in 1971. 
1968 Kabi manufactures pharmaceutics on license from Farmitalia. 
1969 Pharmacia Biotech was formed as a spin-off from Pharmacia based on its dextran based filtering 
technology. 
1970 Swedish Government owned Apoteksbolaget AB was founded. 
1971 Swedish Government acquires Kabi and the company becomes fully owned by Statsföretag. 
1972 Kabi acquires Vitrum and forms the Kabi-Group. 
 Restructuring in Statsföretag: ACO AB, Vitrum AB, AB Grummebolagen and Kabi pharmaceutical 
division becomes subsidiaries of AB Kabi (The Kabi Group) 
1973 Astra and Kabi decide to build joint manufacturing site for penicillin. 
A new company was established, Fermenta, which acquires Kabi's fermentation facilities in 
Strängnäs, which is included in the new manufacturing site. A joint site was considered cost the 
most efficient option, since penicillin was not allowed to be manufactured in the same sites as other 
drugs.  
1974 Grummebolagen and Oxygenol were sold to Svenska Tobaks AB, also part of Statsföretag Group. 
 Kabi group total sales ca 283 MSEK, out of which 104 on export markets. 
1975 Kabi pharmaceutical division was divided into three business areas; Kabi Blodprodukter (blood 
plasma products), Kabi Läkemedel (pharmaceuticals) and Recip (development and production of 
growth hormone was placed in Recip). 
 Kabi Diagnostica was established, 60% owned by Kabi and 40% by AB Atomenergi 
Atomenergi specialized in "Radiofarmaka". Kabi specialized in dry-freezing since 1930s of, among 
others, reagents for laboratories 
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1976 The company Linsoninstrument was transferred to Kabi from the Statsföretag Group. Device 
manufacturing was not part of Kabi's strategy and Linsoninstrument was split up and dispersed in 
Kabi Group. 
Kabi and Astra swap products; Astra acquires Kabi's share of Fermenta and penicillin products. 
Kabi acquires products from Astra. Astra sells Fermenta in 1982 to Refaat El-Sayed. 
1978 KabiVitrum (changes name) signs the first gene-technology based industrial contract with 
Genentech.  
KabiVitrum and Statsföretag AB found KabiGen AB with shared ownership to exploit molecular 
biology. KabiGen becomes the first DNA-technology based company in Scandinavia. 
1979 Pharmacia launches a stabilizing medium for eye surgery, called hyaluron acid, a natural substance 
becoming the base for new Pharmacia products. The spin-off (1994) Bohusbiotech acquires the 
substance. 
1980s Volvo acquires Pharmacia and initiates an expansion strategy. 
1983 The CEO of KabiGen leaves the position and founds Scandigen. 
1984 BioNative is established based on research in KabiVitrum. 
 Ferrosan merges with Leo. 
 Pharmacia Biosensor AB is established by people from Pharmacia (later to be named Biacore AB). 
1985 Statsföretag AB changes name to Procordia AB. 
Pharmacia acquires LKB Products, the main competitor in biotechnical separation instruments. 
LKB Products is integrated in Pharmacia Biotech and located in Umeå. 
Q-Med is spun off (cosmetics based on a synthetic version of the hyaluron acid). 
1986 Pharmacia acquires Leo. 
1987 Labwell9 is spun off (technology for speeding up chemical syntheses in microwave ovens). 
Biosurface Pharma is spun-off as a subsidiary to Pharmacia. Dental research activities stems from a 
Ferrosan project. 
1988 KabiVitrum acquires the West German company Pfrimmer & Co. 
 KabiVitrum changes name to Kabi. 
1989 Kabi acquires the Spanish company Fides. 
1990 Procordia AB and Provendor (Volvo’s food division company) merge to form Procordia group and 
jointly acquires Pharmacia. Volvo and the Government (Procordia) own 42,5% of the company 
each. 
Pharmacia merges with Kabi and forms KabiPharmacia. 
1991 KabiPharmacia acquires patent of the “superprotein”, a protein able to eliminate bad cholesterols 
from the body. 
Biolin is spun off (investment and market consulting). 
                                                 
9 Later renamed Personal Chemistry, which merged with PyroSequencing in 2003 and acquiring Biotage (US) 
in 2003 and changing name to Biotage. 
  32
Mercodia is spun off (diagnostic kits). 
Medeca is spun off (product agents). 
1992 ProGene is spun off (genetic test). 
 KabiPharmacia acquires the Italian pharmaceutical company Pierrel with about 900 employees. 
KabiPharmacia establishes a company within the group named Bioscience Center, which includes, 
among others, the company KabiGen. 
1993 KabiPharmacia acquires the Italian pharmaceutical company Pharmitalia Carlo Erba and the US 
pharmaceutical company Erbamont Inc. 
KabiPharmacia changes name to Pharmacia. 
The Government completely acquires Pharmacia by buying Volvo’s share and sells its share of 
Procordia (other business units of tobacco, food etc.) to Volvo. 
1994 Swedish government sells main part of its shares (retains 14% of the shares and 12% of the votes) 
through an IPO. 
Eurona Medicals is spun off (genetic diagnostics and personalized medicine). 
Medisan Pharmaceuticals (later BioPhausia) is spun off (dextran based infusion solutions and clinical 
dextran for surgery and advanced ulcer treatment). 
Bohusbiotech is spun-off. 
1995 Pharmacia merges with the US company Upjohn. Swedish government retains 7% of the company. 
At this time, Pharmacia has about 6500 employees in Sweden, out of which 25% were R&D people. 
Recip AB is spun off. 
 Marma Medical is spun off (technical and management consulting). 
1996 Development and production of the “superprotein” is closed down. 
1997 Half of the instrument division of former Pharmacia established in 1969, Pharmacia Biotech, is 
acquired by the UK company Amersham International. The new company is named Amersham 
Pharmacia Biotech. 
Two Pharmacia-Upjohn scientists acquire the “superprotein” patent and establish Esperion 
Therapeutics. 
1998 Active Biotech AB acquires parts of Pharmacia’s cancer and immunology R&D. 
 Fresenius Kabi is established as a result of a spin-off and acquisition of a German company. 
Åmic is spun off (microsystems in plastics for bio applications). 
Gyros is spun off (based micro laboratories). 
Visionar is spun off (CRO). 
Resistentia Pharmaceuticals is spun off (develops allergy vaccine). 
1999 Pharmacia-Upjohn merges with the US company Monsanto and changes name to Pharmacia 
Corporation. 
Swedish government divests its remaining share (7%) of Pharmacia-Upjohn. The total share of 
Swedish ownership falls down to 9%. 
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2000 Quintiles AB acquires Pharmacia-Upjohn’s clinical development activities. 
 Pfizer acquire Esperion Therapeutics. 
Pharmacia Corporation divests the last basic research activities and plasma production including 
about 900 employees in a new company Biovitrum. 
2002 Amersham International acquires all shares of Amersham Pharmacia Biotech and changes name to 
Amersham Biosciences. At this time there are about 3400 employees in Uppsala, including spin-offs.  
 Pharmacia Corp. establishes Monsanto based on a spin-off of its agro business. 
 Biovitrum divest the plasma division including about 450 employees (stemming from the 
manufacturing of dried plasma starting in the 1940s in Kärnbolaget) to the Swiss pharmaceutical 
company Octapharma. 
2003 Pfizer acquires Pharmacia Corporation. Total number of Swedish employees is 3900. Pfizer’s 
Swedish marketing company has about 300 employees. The share of Swedish ownership falls down 
to 4%. No more Swedish board members or managers. 
2004 Pharmacia Diagnostics AB is formed as the result of a spin-off, including 1200 employees, and sold 
to two UK investment funds. 
Production facilities and manufacturing of Healon is sold to AMO, American Medical Optical. 
The rest of the shares of Active Biotech is sold (8% of the shares). 
GE Healthcare acquires Amersham Biosciences. 
2005 Total number of Swedish employees is about 2500. Half of the employees are found in 
Uppsala/Stockholm (headquarters counts for 450 employees), about 1000 in Helsingborg and 
around 400 in Strängnäs.  
Manufacturing in Stockholm is decided to shut down by 2008, reducing the number of employees 
by 550. Activities will be allocated to other sites within Pfizer. 
Laboratory in Uppsala is closed, reducing the number of employees by 100. 
2006 Manufacturing site in Uppsala is sold to the Indian company Kemwell. 
Production facilities and manufacturing of Nicorette is sold Johnson & Johnson. About 1000 
employees. 
 GE Healthcare acquires Biacore AB 
The Swedish part of Pfizer now consists of the headquarters in Stockholm, the production facilities 
in Strängnäs and the site in Stockholm, which will be shut down in 2008. In total 1300 employees. 
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Table A1  Pharmacia related spin-offs, divestments and start-ups 
 
Industry Ownership Origin Type Empl
OrgNo Company Name Year est. code Domestic Foreign Pharma Diagn Instr Spin-off Divestment Start-up 2005
5561307728 Biacore AB 1984 33200 x x x 182
5562586882 Q-Med 1985 24420 x x x 350
5564874922 Biotage Sweden AB* 1987 73103 x x x 68
5563374759 Carmetec (now Nocet Invest AB) 1988 x x x 18
5564181211 Medeca Pharma AB 1991 51460 x x x 3
5564591393 Biolin Medical AB 1991 73103 x x x 0
5561575100 Mercodia AB 1991 73103 x x x 36
5564850153 BioPhausia AB 1994 51460 x x x 7
* Includes previous firms Labwell/Personal Chemistry, Pyrosequencing and Biotage (US) 664
5564989951 Marma Medical AB 1995 74140 x x x 1
5564988425 Recip (Haninge) 1995 74150 x x x 82
5566624366 Recip (Karlskoga) 1995 24420 x x x 196
5565875753 Visionar Biomedical AB 1998 73103 x x x 5
5565468476 Åmic AB 1998 73103 x x x 26
5566725429 Gyros AB 2004 73105 x x x 54
364
5565418323 Active Biotech Research AB 1998 73103 x x x 86
5564134517 Quintiles Services AB 2000 73103 x x x 0
5560389321 Biovitrum 2001 73103 x x x 604
5561081919 GE Healthcare Biosciences AB 
prev. Pharmacia Biotech
1997 24140 x x x 1575
5565616058 Fresenius Kabi 1998 24420 x x x 743
5565504833 Octapharma AB 2002 24420 x x x 353
5560413204 PhaDia AB 2004 24660 x x x 476
3837
5565557781 Anamar Medical AB 1998 73102 x x x 14
14
TOTAL 95 4215
PHARMA 2096
DIAGN 490
INSTR 1629
FOREIGN 3147  
 
Source: ScanBit 
 
Table A2  Pharmacia related university start-ups 
 
Empl
OrgNo Company Name Year est. 2005 Industry code
Pre M&A spinn-offs
5561467829 Medical Products Octagon 1971 2 24420
5563362473 Pegasus Lab 1984 15 NA
5563359446 Radi Medical Systems 1988 153 33101
5564897741 Neopharma 1994 14 24420
184
Post M&A spinn-offs
5563135598 Melacure Therapeutics AB 1997 37 73103
5565541587 Resistentia Pharmaceuticals AB 1998 17 73103
5565494019 Isconova 1999 5 73103
59
Unidentified spinn-offs or closed down activities
NA Bio-Agri 1996 Acquired
5562866508 Hemapure Systems AB 1998 Closed down  
Source: ScanBit 
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Table A3  Pharmacia related start-ups 
 
Empl
OrgNo Company Name Year est. 2005 Industry code
Pre M&A start-ups
5564702065 MiniDoc AB 1986 0 72210
5565819249 Radi Medical Devices AB 1988 2 73103
5563317840 CES Management AB 1988 0 74140
5563374759 Carmetec (now Nocet Invest AB) 1988 18 NA
9166710310 Allect Consulting HB 1989 NA 85144
5564303922 TdB Consultancy AB 1990 2 74202
5564106234 Mark-In AB 1990 1 74409
5565244737 Göran Andrae Konsult AB 1990 1 NA
5564079498 Kiptech AB 1990 1 74202
5563949774 Ollajvs Produktutveckling AB 1990 1 74202
5563990976 Projektekonomi Bengt Jacobowsky AB 1990 NA NA
5564384674 Olle Rückertz Public Relations AB 1991 NA NA
5564170743 Corline Systems AB 1991 4 73105
5562873124 C-O Sjöberg Engineering AB 1991 1 74202
5564509981 Upsal Biologicals & Pharmaceuticals AB 1991 NA 51460
5564270881 Agorand AB 1991 1 NA
5564362621 BPT Optik AB 1991 1 74202
5564277993 Pricer AB 1991 41 72210
5564584729 Scandinavian Regulatory Services AB 1992 8 24420
5564403391 Mediject AB 1992 NA NA
4804035113 Mizarra Business Management 1993 1 NA
9696034322 Bojama Consult KB 1993 NA 74140
5564955788 Gunilla Eketorp Kemdok AB 1994 1 73103
5564861374 M & D Packaging AB 1994 1 73103
9696029678 Tesseco HB 1994 NA 74202
85
Post M&A start-ups
5565000600 Orexo (prev. Diabact) 1995 36 73103
5565061834 Jan Gustavsson Personalkonsult AB 1995 NA NA
5565138830 Magnolia - För kreativ utveckling AB 1995 1 74140
5562723840 Ardevo AB 1996 0 74140
5565557781 Anamar Medical AB 1998 14 73102
5566022728 Innoventus 1999 0 NA
5565238382 Bioventia Capital AB 2000 2 74140
9166720657 Midas Innova HB 2000 NA 74140
5566168356 Innoventus Project AB 2001 4 73103
5565900791 Niconovum AB 2003 4 73103
5566590658 Acure Pharma AB 2004 4 73103
5566636998 Olink 2004 2 73102
5566651484 Saromics 2006 NA 74202
67
Unidentified start-ups or closed down activities
NA Lots AB 1979 Acquired
NA KP Elteknik 1986 Unknown activity
NA Projekt Organisation AB 1987 Unknown activity
5563396877 Svenska H-Gruppen Konsumentprodukter AB 1989 Unknown activity
NA Arcsoft AB 1990 Unknown activity
NA Åke Strömberg Ledarcoach 1991 Unknown activity
NA Qraft AB 1992 Unknown activity
NA SumIT System AB 1993 Unknown activity
5560386715 PGL Professional Genetics Laboratory AB 1993 Closed down
NA Snabb Personal AB 1995 Unknown activity
NA Subjecta Scandinavia AB 1996 Unknown activity
NA Mizarra Medical 1996 Unknown activity
5565323440 Engema AB 1996 Closed down
NA Företagsjuristen FJS 1996 Non-active
5565332664 Qualimetrics AB 1996 Closed down
NA AproPos 1997 Unknown activity
NA Inbio 1999 Unknown activity
NA Micro-Morph 2006 Unknown activity  
 
Source: ScanBit 
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